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THE PROSECUTION OF INCITEMENT TO GENOCIDE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
HJ van der Merwe* 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The phenomenon of collective violence1 is complex and, as yet, not wholly 
understood.2 This notwithstanding, the incidence of collective violence is not entirely 
unpredictable. This is especially true of one particularly egregious form thereof, 
namely, genocide.3 Inflammatory speech, insidious propaganda and incitement to 
crime - all of which are directed at a specific group - are recurring hallmarks of the 
hatred that invariably precedes genocide. Just as sparks under certain conditions are 
more conducive to causing a fire, acts of communication that feed on, disseminate, 
and actively intensify pre-existing hatred towards a particular group often represent 
a precursor to as well as a powerful catalyst for genocide.  
 
Most acts precursory to or preparatory of genocide are not directly criminalised 
under international law.4 Widespread or repeated instances of hate speech, for 
                                                 
*  Hermanus J van der Merwe. BAcc, LLB, LLM, LLD (Stellenbosch University). Lecturer, Faculty of 
Law, University of the Western Cape (UWC). Email: hvandermerwe@uwc.ac.za. The author is 
grateful to Prof Israel "Solly" Leeman for his comments and editorial assistance. 
1  Collective violence may be defined as: "[T]he instrumental use of violence by people who 
identify themselves as members of a group – whether this group is transitory or has a more 
permanent identity – against another group or set of individuals, in order to achieve political, 
economic or social objectives." See Krug 2002 whqlibdoc.who.int 215. 
2  Ceretti "Collective Violence" 8; Jonassohn 1998 migs.concordia.ca: "In spite of the attempts by 
some psychological theories, it is difficult to understand how people who have lived peacefully in 
the same communities, have worked together, and have intermarried, can suddenly kill in the 
most brutal way." 
3  Early in 1994, three months prior to the genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda in April of the same 
year, Major General Romeo Dallaire unsuccessfully tried to warn the United Nations about the 
impending genocide. The international community was also aware of the hate speech and 
propaganda activities of Radio Télévision Libres des Milles Collines (RTLM) prior to the genocide 
(see Schabas Genocide 333). It is now widely accepted that timely intervention may have saved 
countless lives. Conceivably, and with the benefit of hindsight, the pro-active prosecution of 
individuals for the inchoate crime of incitement to genocide may have gone some way towards 
preventing or at least minimising the spread of the massacre. It must be acknowledged, 
however, that there would almost certainly have been a lack of political will on the part of the 
Hutu-dominated government of the time to initiate such prosecutions. 
4  The preparatory act of "studies and research for the purpose of developing the technique of 
genocide" was included in the Secretariat Draft of the Genocide Convention but excluded from 
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example, may amount to acts precursory to or preparatory of genocide in that they 
increase the general risk of genocide.5 Yet hate speech is neither specifically 
prohibited under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (1948) (hereafter the Genocide Convention), nor under the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court (hereafter the Rome Statute).6 In this regard, a 
distinct and particularly egregious form of hate speech, namely, direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide, represents a recognised exception. It is firmly 
established as an international crime under the Genocide Convention and the Rome 
Statute as well as under customary international law.7 
 
In 1996, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) became the first 
legal institution to hand down a conviction for direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide in Prosecutor v Akayesu.8 Despite its criminalisation under the Genocide 
Convention, the actual prosecution of incitement to genocide represents a relatively 
new development on the international legal stage. Furthermore, although incitement 
to genocide is now also criminalised in many domestic legal systems, the prosecution 
thereof is almost without precedent on the domestic level.9 This is so in spite of the 
fact that in general international criminal justice, and in particular the Rome Statute, 
place the primary responsibility for prosecuting international crime on domestic legal 
systems. The ability and willingness of states party to this project (including South 
Africa) to align themselves with their international legal obligations to prosecute 
international crimes, including the crime of direct and public incitement to commit 
                                                                                                                                                        
the final version of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(1948). 
5  See Schabas 2000 McGill LJ 144: "The road to genocide in Rwanda was paved with hate 
speech." However, hate speech in and of itself does not automatically constitute direct and 
public incitement to genocide. This is discussed in more detail below (see para 5.2). 
6  However, various international human rights instruments contain provisions aimed at combatting 
hate speech by requiring its prohibition within states. Notable in this regard are Art 4 of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) and Art 
20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). 
7  See Art III(c) of the Genocide Convention and Art 25(3)(e) of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (1998). Regarding the status of direct and public incitement to 
genocide as a crime under customary international law, see para 6.2.3 below. 
8  ICTR Prosecutor v Akayesu (Trial Chamber: Judgment) Case No ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998 
(hereafter Akayesu). 
9  In March 2013, Yvonne Basebya was convicted of incitement to genocide by the Hague District 
Court in the Netherlands. See Basebya District Court of The Hague, Case No 09/748004-09, 1 
March 2013. 
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genocide, have become a matter of crucial importance to the future success of the 
international regime of criminal law. The success of the project will be measured 
broadly on two fronts: first, in terms of achieving the goal of accountability for 
perpetrators of international crime, and, secondly, in terms of the ability of the 
international criminal law regime as a whole to prevent violations of international law 
in the long run. As will be discussed below, the goal of prevention is of particular 
significance in relation to genocide and direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide.  
 
The aims of this article are first, to provide a brief historical and teleological 
overview of the crime of direct and public incitement to genocide under international 
law, and second, to examine the criminalisation of incitement to genocide under 
South African law as well as the country's capacity to prosecute the crime 
domestically. It is argued that South Africa is not, at present, ideally placed to reap 
the preventative benefits of prosecuting incitement to commit genocide at the 
domestic level. It is submitted that the amendment of existing national legislation, 
namely, the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
Act 27 of 2002 (hereafter the ICC Act), to provide for a separate statutory offence of 
direct and public incitement to commit genocide will remedy this defect. 
 
2  The role of incitement before and during genocide 
 
Incitement to commit genocide is not only morally blameworthy conduct in violation 
of the norms of the international community, but also extremely dangerous conduct 
in that it typically precedes and actively pursues the commission of acts of genocide. 
History confirms that incitement is one of the most dangerous "sparks" in the early 
stages of genocide. The prosecution of Julius Streicher before the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (hereafter the Nuremberg IMT) provides compelling 
evidence of the destructive effects that incitement to genocide may have. Streicher 
was renowned for his fierce hatred of Jews and, over the course of many years prior 
to the Second World War, had urged for the extermination of the Jews in Europe 
through numerous articles in the anti-Semitic newspaper, Der Stürmer, of which he 
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was the founder. In one of his articles, for example, he referred to Jews in the 
generic sense as "a parasite, an enemy, an evil-doer, a disseminator of diseases who 
must be destroyed in the interest of mankind".10 In this example, the attempt to 
dehumanise Jewish persons in order to facilitate the destruction of the group is 
incontrovertible. Today the culmination of the efforts of Streicher and others, 
namely, the Jewish Holocaust, represents a lasting memorial to the extreme menace 
posed by incitement to genocide. Shortly after the War Streicher was convicted of 
crimes against humanity by the Nuremberg IMT for his role in the persecution (on 
political and racial grounds) of Jewish people during the Holocaust. The conviction of 
Julius Streicher at the Nuremberg IMT represented de facto the first conviction for 
incitement to genocide at the international level. However, the crimes of direct and 
public incitement to commit genocide and also of genocide were only later 
recognised under international law in the Genocide Convention of 1948.  
 
The dangers of inflammatory speech burst onto the world stage following the 
horrors of the Holocaust. The adoption of the Genocide Convention shortly 
thereafter was a manifestation of, amongst other things, a new international 
awareness concerning the role of speech in the preparation for and execution of 
genocide. From a broader perspective, however, the potential dangers of speech 
have long been recognised. There is, for example, an age-old Japanese proverb, 
which holds that "the tongue is more to be feared than the sword". The 18th century 
English writer and poet, Martin Tupper, also warned of "the misery and crime an 
aggravating tongue can cause". There is also recognition of the dangers of 
inflammatory speech in The Bible11, according to which "the tongue can no man 
tame; it is an unruly evil, full of deadly poison".  
 
The perils of incitement to genocide were first judicially recognised, albeit indirectly, 
at the Nuremberg IMT. The Nuremberg IMT described the role of Julius Streicher, 
also in metaphorical terms, as one of having "infected the German mind with the 
                                                 
10  Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression: Opinion and Judgment (United States Government Printing 
Office Washington 1947) 129 (hereafter Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression). 
11  The Bible, Book of James 3:8 (King James Version). 
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virus of anti-Semitism".12 The Tribunal held further that he had in effect injected a 
"poison" into the minds of thousands of Germans, "which caused them to follow the 
National Socialist policy of Jewish persecution and extermination."13 More recently, in 
Prosecutor v Nahimana et al,14 the ICTR Trial Chamber held that Hassan Ngeze, the 
owner and editor of the virulently anti-Tutsi newspaper, Kangura, had "poisoned the 
minds of his readers" thereby causing thousands of innocent deaths. 
 
Genocide does not arise in a vacuum, nor is it an absolutely spontaneous event.15 It 
builds momentum over many years in a process driven by complex historical and 
political causes. In the build-up to genocide it is typical for messages of hate to 
precede calls to action.16 During the negotiation of the Genocide Convention the 
Russian delegation noted, in reference to the Holocaust, that:17 
 
It was impossible that hundreds of thousands of people should commit so many 
crimes unless they had been incited to do so and unless the crimes had been 
premeditated and carefully organized. He asked how in those circumstances, the 
inciters and organizers of the crime could be allowed to escape punishment, when 
they were the ones really responsible for the atrocities committed. 
 
More recently, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination18 listed the following as "factors known to be important components 
of situations leading to conflict and genocide": "Systematic and widespread use and 
                                                 
12  Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression 129. 
13  Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression 130. 
14  ICTR Prosecutor v Nahimana et al (Trial Chamber: Judgment) Case No ICTR-99-52-T, 3 
December 2003 para 1101 (hereafter Nahimana (Trail Chamber)). The case is discussed at para 
5.2 below. 
15  The relative "predictability" of genocide is further evinced by Dr. Gregory Stanton's well-known 
attempt to standardise the genocidal "process" through the identification of the eight 
"predictable but not inexorable" stages of genocide. The eight stages are classification, 
symbolisation, dehumanisation, organisation, polarisation, preparation, extermination and denial. 
The first six of the eight stages identified by Stanton may be described as preparatory stages 
involving, for example, classification of a group or groups, dehumanisation of the victim group 
and polarisation through inflammatory speech. According to Stanton, incitement to commit 
genocide is especially common in the polarisation stage, but may continue during the actual 
genocide. See Stanton Date Unknown www.genocidewatch.org. 
16  This was, for example, the case in Germany where the fictitious book, Protocols of the Elders of 
Zion, played an instrumental part in stirring up feelings of anti-Semitism. It is interesting to note 
that the book was first published as a self-contained work in 1905, almost thirty years before the 
rise of Hitler in German politics. 
17  UN Doc A/C.6/SR.84 (1948) 241 (statements by Mr. Morozov). 
18  UN Doc CERD/C/67/Misc.8 (2005). 
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acceptance of speech or propaganda promoting hatred and/or inciting violence 
against minority groups, particularly in the media", as well as "[g]rave statements by 
political leaders/prominent people that express support for affirmation of superiority 
of a race or an ethnic group, dehumanize and demonize minorities, or condone or 
justify violence against a minority." 
 
An understanding of the trends preceding genocide remains somewhat 
underdeveloped. This is largely due to the fact that they can be identified through 
the post facto study of the build-up to genocide within a specific context only. It may 
also be attributable to the fact that the prosecution of the perpetrators of genocide 
has hitherto been directed mostly at the so-called "big fish" perpetrators or 
architects of genocide, which most often involves the determination of liability in 
respect of completed acts of genocide. 
 
The horrors of the Holocaust have bestowed upon the world the maxim of "never 
again"19 in respect of the crime of genocide. Since then, the international community 
has failed to uphold this motto. This notwithstanding, it is today generally accepted 
that the unique and reprehensible nature of genocide, the crime of crimes, calls for a 
preventative legal response. Although the criminalisation of genocide is widely 
preached inter alia as a means through which to deter genocide, only timeous and 
pro-active prosecution of incitement to commit genocide can be viewed as a 
concrete manifestation of the preventative purposes underlying the law related to 
genocide and genocide-related acts.20 The benefits of the prosecution of 
perpetrators of incitement to genocide can be realised only through the prosecution 
                                                 
19  Consider, for example, the following remarks of the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon: "The 
Holocaust, the killing fields of Cambodia, the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica, and other 
large-scale tragedies underlined the failure of individual States to live up to their responsibilities 
and their obligations under international humanitarian law. These events also raised troubling 
questions about the will and capacity of the international community to protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, as well as their incitement. 
'Never again' is the oft-heard cry. But I am haunted by the fear that we do not live up to this 
call" (my emphasis). See Ki-moon 2012 www.un.org. 
20  See Benesch 2011 voicesthatpoison.files.wordpress.com: "Incitement is of particular interest for 
genocide prevention since it is often a precursor to – if not also a prerequisite for – genocide and 
other forms of mass violence." 
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thereof on the domestic level and, where there is an unwillingness or inability to do 
so, before international courts. 
 
3  Unpacking the crime of incitement in South African law 
 
In South African law, as in most common law systems, incitement constitutes a 
distinct crime of an inchoate or incomplete nature as opposed to a mode of 
complicity.21 As such, it is among the exceptions to the general rule that criminal 
laws prohibit only the consequences or circumstances brought about by a person's 
unlawful conduct or omission. Therefore, incitement essentially has a relatively 
limited application. The prosecution thereof is primarily dependent on the failure of 
the incitee, for whatever reason, to successfully commit the crime towards which 
s/he has been moved by the inciter. Should the incitement be successful – that is, 
should it lead to the commission of the incited crime by the incitee - the inciter may 
be prosecuted as a co-perpetrator of or accomplice to the particular crime in 
question, depending on the surrounding circumstances of the case.22  
 
3.1  The common law crime of incitement 
 
Incitement is a crime under South African common law.23 Although incitement now 
constitutes a statutory offence, the early judicial interpretation of the common law 
crime of incitement remains relevant and must be considered here. South African 
courts are likely also to turn to common law sources and case law for general 
guidance in any future domestic prosecution of incitement to genocide. 
 
                                                 
21  Cassese International Criminal Law 402. As opposed to civil law systems that treat incitement as 
a form of complicity in relation to the actual offence.  
22  Burchell Principles 642. Burchell argues that incitement should be confined to situations where 
the incitee did not react to the inciter's urgings because the completion of the crime means that 
the inciter must be prosecuted either as a perpetrator acting through an agent or as an 
accomplice in relation to the incitee's criminal action(s). The doctrine of common purpose (or 
joint criminal enterprise under international law) may also find application where the act of 
incitement is successful.  
23  S v Nlhovo 1921 AD 485. 
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At common law, the crime of incitement consists of an unlawful communication by 
the inciter to the incitee(s), made with the intent to move, influence, encourage or 
prompt the incitee(s) towards the commission of crime.24 Proof of a causal link 
between the act of incitement and an unlawful result is not required. The crime is 
committed even though the incitee remains unresponsive to the inciter's efforts to 
move him/her towards the commission of crime.25 According to the judgment in S v 
Nkosiyana,26 "the decisive question in each case is whether the accused reached and 
sought to influence the mind of the other person towards the commission of a 
crime." As such, the crime of incitement is essentially premised on the inciter's guilty 
mind accompanied by conduct in the form of some effective act of communication 
directed to the incitee(s).27 Such acts of communication may take various forms, all 
of which are of only "secondary importance" in determining the accused's liability.28  
 
Incitement cannot be committed negligently. Some form of intent on the part of the 
accused must be present. In this regard, dolus eventualis will suffice, in which case 
it must be shown that "the accused foresaw the possibility that his communication 
would reach and influence the mind of the incitee(s) but proceeded anyway".29  
 
3.2  The Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956 
 
The broad scope of incitement under the common law was largely retained in its 
statutory form. According to section 18(2)(b) of the Riotous Assemblies Act: 
 
[A]ny person who […] incites, instigates, commands, or procures any other person 
to commit any offence, whether at common law or against a statute or statutory 
regulation, shall be guilty of an offence […] 
 
                                                 
24  See S v Nkosiyana 1966 4 SA 655 (A) 658 (hereafter Nkosiyana); Kemp Criminal Law 260; 
Burchell Principles 642. 
25  See S v Nlhovo 1921 AD 485; Nkosiyana paras 658H-659B. 
26  Nkosiyana paras 658H-659B. 
27  Should the act of communication be ineffectual, in the sense that the inciter does not 
successfully reach the incitee's mind; the crime is that of attempted incitement - an incomplete 
inchoate crime. 
28  Nkosiyana para 658H. 
29  Kemp Criminal Law 261; Burchell Principles 645. 
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Furthermore, according to the section, such a person is "liable on conviction to the 
punishment to which a person convicted of actually committing that offence would 
be liable". This represents the maximum punishment that the inciter may receive 
upon conviction. In practice the inciter often receives a lighter punishment than that 
for which an actual perpetrator of the crime to which s/he was incited would be 
liable.30 
 
4  The definition of genocide31 
 
Before proceeding to a discussion of the crime of direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide under international law, it is necessary to provide a brief outline of 
the essential elements of the crime of genocide.  
 
The Rome Statute represents a near codification of the core crimes under 
international law. As such it contains an authoritative definition of the crime of 
genocide. Article 6 of the Statute defines genocide as follows:32 
 
For the purpose of this Statute, "genocide" means any of the following acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
 
Genocide requires a specific form of dolus (dolus specialis), namely, genocidal intent. 
According to the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Krstić:33 
                                                 
30  Snyman Strafreg 316. 
31  The term "genocide" is attributed to Raphael Lemkin. The word is an amalgamation of the Greek 
word genos, meaning "race" or "group", and the Latin word caedere, which denotes "killing". 
32  This definition is taken verbatim from the Genocide Convention, Art II. 
33  ICTY Prosecutor v Krstić (Appeals Chamber: Judgment) Case No IT-98-33-A, 19 April 2004 para 
134; see also ICTY Prosecutor v Krstić (Trial Chamber: Judgment) Case No IT-98-33, 2 August 
2001 para 700: "It can […] be argued […] that genocide is the most serious crime because of its 
requirement of the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious 
group, as such. In this sense, even though the criminal acts themselves involved in a genocide 
may not vary from those in a crime against humanity or a crime against the laws and customs of 
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[The] gravity [of the crime of genocide] is reflected in the stringent requirements of 
specific intent. Convictions for genocide can be entered only where that intent has 
been unequivocally established. 
 
In Akayesu,34 the ICTR Trial Chamber held that in order for any of the five 
underlying acts listed in article 2(2) of the ICTR Statute35 (also those acts listed in 
article 6 of the Rome Statute) to constitute genocide: 
 
…the act must have been committed against one or several individuals, because 
such individual or individuals were members of a specific group, and specifically 
because they belonged to this group. Thus, the victim is chosen not because of his 
individual identity, but rather on account of his membership of a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group. The victim of the act is therefore a member of a group, 
chosen as such, which, hence, means that the victim of the crime of genocide is the 
group itself and not only the individual. 
 
Thus, to be guilty of genocide, a perpetrator must harbour the intent to contribute 
towards the destruction, at least in part, of one of the four groups mentioned above, 
as such. The qualifier "as such" denotes an intention to destroy the group as a 
separate and distinct entity.36 Thus, when members of a group are targeted due to 
their membership of that group and the offender's intent is discriminatory in nature, 
it is not sufficient to warrant a conviction for genocide, as the offender did not 
intend his or her actus reus to contribute to the destruction of a protected group.37  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
war, the convicted person is, because of his specific intent, deemed to be more blameworthy." 
In general, caution should be applied to the determination of the existence of genocidal intent. 
The crime of genocide has developed as one of the few crimes that are viewed as so egregious 
that they offend humanity as a whole. A failure to uphold the distinction between criminal acts 
intentionally perpetrated against members of a group and criminal acts perpetrated with the 
intent to contribute to the destruction of a protected group (the strict threshold of genocidal 
intent), may lead to the exploitation of the label of genocide and will ultimately detract from the 
international moral resonance reflected in the definition of the crime of genocide. 
34  Akayesu para 521 (footnote omitted). 
35  UNSC Resolution 955 (1994). 
36  ICTY Prosecutor v Jelisic (Trial Chamber: Judgment) Case No IT-95-10-T, 14 December 1999 
para 79. 
37  ICJ Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007 43 para 187; 
see also Kemp Criminal Law 531-533; Werle International Criminal Law 276. 
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5  Direct and public incitement to commit genocide under international 
law 
5.1  The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (1948) 
 
Article III(c) of the Genocide Convention criminalises "direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide". As indicated by the full title of the Convention, it tackles the 
problem of genocide through a two-pronged approach based on prevention and 
punishment. However, it has been noted that this approach is in practice mostly 
skewed towards punishment.38 Nonetheless, the crime of direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide was specifically included in the Convention due to its 
critical role in the planning of genocide.39 The specific aim underlying the 
criminalisation of direct and public incitement to commit genocide is to timeously 
prevent the perpetration of concrete acts of genocide through the prosecution of a 
separate, inchoate offence.40 This specific aim supports or enhances the 
preventative purpose that generally underlies the criminalisation and punishment of 
conduct amounting to genocide. Thus, the crime of incitement to genocide may be 
described as a crime intended to serve a super-preventative purpose. 
 
The drafting history of the Genocide Convention sheds some light on the scope and 
meaning of the prohibition of direct and public incitement to commit genocide under 
international law. Schabas41 provides the following summation as regards the 
drafting history of the Convention from a procedural perspective: 
 
Drafting of the Convention proceeded in three main stages. First, the United 
Nations Secretariat composed a draft text. Prepared with the assistance of three 
experts, Raphael Lemkin, Vespasian Pella and Henri Donnedieu de Vabres, it was 
actually a compendium of concepts meant to assist the General Assembly rather 
than any attempt to provide a workable instrument or to resolve major differences. 
Second, the Secretariat draft was reworked by an Ad Hoc Committee set up under 
the authority of the Economic and Social Council. Finally, the Ad Hoc Committee 
draft was the basis of negotiations in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, 
                                                 
38  Schabas 2000 McGill LJ 170. 
39  Akayesu para 551. 
40  Cassese International Criminal Law 403. 
41  Schabas Date Unknown untreaty.un.org. 
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in late 1948, which agreed upon the final text of the Convention, submitting it for 
formal adoption to the plenary General Assembly. 
 
In the Secretariat Draft Convention, incitement to genocide was formulated as 
"direct public incitement to any act of genocide, whether the incitement be 
successful or not".42 The subsequent Ad Hoc Committee Draft provided that "direct 
incitement in public or in private to commit the crime of genocide whether such 
incitement be successful or not" is a punishable act.43 The Sixth Committee of the 
General Assembly thereafter considered the draft of the Ad Hoc Committee. During 
these deliberations the USA expressed concern about the potential impact of this 
formulation of incitement to genocide as regards the freedom of the press, 
aggressively campaigning along with several other states for the total removal of the 
provision relating to incitement to genocide.44 However, Belgium proposed an 
amendment which excluded the phrase "whether the incitement be successful or 
not".45 It was reasoned that this would create a definition broad enough to allow 
each state to decide for itself whether or not acts of genocide are required before 
the prosecution of incitement to genocide could take place.46 The Sixth Committee 
also voted in favour of deleting the reference to private incitement. As a result, the 
final wording of Article III(c) of the Genocide Convention, although it does qualify 
the crime by requiring proof of "direct" and "public" incitement to commit genocide, 
is an open-ended definition in the sense that it makes no explicit reference to the 
success (or failure) of the act of incitement. Nor does it define the qualifiers "direct" 
and "public".47 The final wording, although quite open-ended, represents a "precise 
                                                 
42  UN Doc E/447 (1947), Art II(II)(2). 
43  UN Doc E/AC.25/12 (1948), Art IV(c). 
44  See Schabas Genocide 321-322. Earlier in the drafting process, the USA proposed adding the 
phrase "when such incitement takes place under circumstances which may reasonably result in 
the commission of acts of genocide." This was to ensure that freedom of speech could be limited 
only so as to prevent "clear and present danger" to the rights of others. See UN Doc E/623 
(1948) 14 and 37. See also Schabas 2000 McGill LJ 152. 
45  Belgium also proposed dropping the phrase "or in private", the inclusion of which was supported 
by, amongst others, Venezuela on the basis that "[i]ncitement could be carried out in public, but 
it could also take place in private, through individual consultation, by letter or even by 
telephone" and that "[it] was necessary to punish both forms of incitement'." See UN Doc 
A/C.6/SR.84 (1948) 208. See also Schabas 2000 McGill LJ. 
46  See Cassese International Criminal Law 403-404. 
47  As will be discussed further in para 5.2, the ICTR will leave behind a valuable body of 
jurisprudence as regards the meaning of "direct" and "public" incitement. 
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and measured formulation" aimed at balancing the goals of preventing genocide and 
respecting the freedom of expression.48 
 
South Africa acceded to the Genocide Convention in 1998. Accordingly, South Africa 
has an international legal obligation to prosecute or extradite (aud dedere aut 
judicare) perpetrators of genocide as well as of direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide. Under the rules governing state responsibility, South Africa may 
incur international responsibility for a failure to do so. South Africa, however, has 
taken a positive step to avoid such liability by enacting national legislation, namely, 
the ICC Act, which will be discussed further below. 
 
5.2  Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda49 
 
The ICTR was created by the United Nations Security Council (hereafter the UNSC) 
to prosecute perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity and serious 
violations of international humanitarian law committed between 1 January 1994 and 
31 December 1994 in Rwanda or outside Rwanda by Rwandan citizens.50 Article 
2(3)(c) of the ICTR Statute criminalises "direct and public incitement to genocide", 
which is listed as one of five punishable acts under the Statute. Direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide constitutes a distinct crime under the Statute. Article 
2(3)(c) was first interpreted by the Tribunal in Akayesu51 and thereafter further 
                                                 
48  Mendel "Study on International Standards" 6-7. 
49  The ICTR's "sister tribunal", the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 
has jurisdiction to prosecute perpetrators of incitement to genocide committed in the territory of 
the former Yugoslavia since 1991. Article 4(3)(c) of the ICTY Statute makes "direct and public 
incitement to genocide" a prosecutable offence. However, since there have been no convictions 
of individuals for direct and public incitement to genocide at the ICTY, and due to the identical 
wording of Art 4(3)(c) of the ICTY Statute and Art 2(3)(c) of the ICTR Statute, this article 
considers only the latter and the interpretation thereof by the ICTR. 
50  UNSC Resolution 955 (1994), Art 1. 
51  Since the first conviction for the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide before 
the ICTR in Akayesu in 1998, much attention has been devoted to the distinction between direct 
and public incitement to commit genocide, hate speech and persecution as a crime against 
humanity. This debate, as well as the debate as regards the limitation of the right to freedom of 
expression and freedom of speech in relation to speech crimes, is beyond the scope of this 
article. However, considering the judgment in African National Congress v Harmse: In Re Harmse 
v Vawda (Afriforum Intervening) 2011 5 SA 460 (GSJ), in which it was held that "the publication 
and chanting of the words 'dubula ibhunu', prima facie satisfies the crime of incitement to 
commit murder" (para 139), as well as South Africa's international legal obligations towards the 
prosecution and prevention of genocide, it is submitted that it is highly unlikely for the domestic 
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explicated in Nahimana et al.52 These cases in particular have provided valuable 
interpretive guidance as to the scope of direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide. 
 
Jean-Paul Akayesu was indicted before the ICTR on fifteen counts, which included 
direct and public incitement to commit genocide (count fourthe). The Trial Chamber 
found that Akayesu had incited the killing of Tutsis by urging the population to 
eliminate of "the accomplices of the Inkotanyi".53 At the time Akayesu was the 
bourgmestre of the Taba commune in the Prefecture of Gitarama, Rwanda. Whilst in 
this position of power, Akayesu seized the opportunity to (ab)use his authority and 
to convey a message that would be interpreted as a call to kill Tutsis in general.54 
The Trial Chamber found that he possessed the "intent to directly create a particular 
state of mind in his audience necessary to lead to the destruction of the Tutsi group, 
as such".55 
 
Regarding the open-ended definition of direct and public incitement to genocide, the 
Trial Chamber in Akayesu56 held that: 
 
…it cannot […] be inferred that the intent of the drafters was not to punish 
unsuccessful acts of incitement. In light of the overall travaux [préparatoires of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
criminalisation of incitement to genocide to constitute an unjustified limitation of the right to 
freedom of expression in s 16 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Sections 
16(2)(b)-(c) of the Constitution provide that freedom of expression does not extend to 
"incitement of imminent violence" or "advocacy of hatred […] that constitutes incitement to 
cause harm." Furthermore, in terms of the general parameters of s 36 of the Constitution the 
amendment of the ICC Act to reflect the specific crime of direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide would explicitly provide for the limitation of the right to freedom of expression in terms 
of a law of general application. Such a limitation would be reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society since it is not only strongly reflective of the values in the Constitution, 
particularly the right to human dignity in the Bill of Rights, but also directed at the prevention of 
egregious harm to all members of South African society. 
52  See Zahar 2005 Criminal Law Forum 33-34: "From the point of view of legal precedent, however, 
the judgment in Nahimana et al would seem to stand alone. The centrality of the incitement 
charge to the case, the wealth of material underpinning it, the size of the written judgment - 
with its 1,110 paragraphs and pioneer narrative voice - ensure that any future litigation on the 
subject, in an international or domestic setting, will start here." The author also offered sharp 
criticism of the Trial Chamber's judgment. See also Orentlicher 2006 Am U Int'l L Rev, who also 
provides a critical perspective on the judgment.  
53  Akayesu para 673. Inkotanyi refers to soldiers of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). 
54  Akayesu para 673. 
55  Akayesu para 674. 
56  Akayesu para 561. 
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Genocide Convention], the Chamber holds the view that the drafters of the 
Convention simply decided not to specifically mention that such a form of 
incitement could be punished. 
 
The prosecution of incitement to commit genocide does not require proof of the 
existence of a current or completed genocide. According to the Trial Chamber"57 
 
…the fact that [inchoate offences] are in themselves particularly dangerous because 
of the high risk they carry for society, even if they fail to produce results, warrants 
that they be punished as an exceptional measure. The Chamber holds that 
genocide clearly falls within the category of crimes so serious that direct and public 
incitement to commit such a crime must be punished as such, even where such 
incitement failed to produce the result expected by the perpetrator.58 
 
The Trial Chamber thus highlighted the preventative objective underlying 
punishment for direct and public incitement to commit genocide.  
 
As regards the definitional elements of the crime, the Trial Chamber in Akayesu59 
held that direct and public incitement to commit genocide denotes: 
 
…directly provoking the perpetrator(s) to commit genocide, whether through 
speeches, shouting or threats uttered in public places or at public gatherings, or 
through the sale or dissemination, offer for sale or display of written material or 
printed matter in public places or at public gatherings, or through the public display 
of placards or posters, or through any other means of audiovisual communication. 
 
Furthermore:60 
 
The mens rea required for the crime of direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide lies in the intent to directly prompt or provoke another to commit 
genocide. It implies a desire on the part of the perpetrator to create by his actions 
a particular state of mind necessary to commit such a crime in the minds of the 
person(s) he is so engaging. That is to say that the person who is inciting to 
commit genocide must have himself the specific intent to commit genocide, namely, 
                                                 
57  Akayesu para 562. 
58  See also Cassese International Criminal Law 419: "…dispensing with proof of a causal link has 
thus far been a way of distinguishing incitement to genocide from modes of responsibility like 
instigation or complicity, and thus avoids redundancy." See also Werle 2007 JICJ 972: 
"Incitement also covers cases where genocide has been completed but where the causal nexus 
of an act of instigation cannot be proven." 
59  Akayesu para 559. 
60  Akayesu para 560. 
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to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as 
such. 
 
Therefore, it may be said that the fault requirement of direct and public incitement 
to genocide is the same as that for genocide proper, namely, genocidal intent (as 
discussed at para 4). 
 
The Nahimana case differs markedly from the Akayesu case in that the charges 
against the accused revolved around the systematic use of mass media channels, 
radio and print media, to incite genocide (hence the case is widely referred to as the 
Media case). Two of the accused were the founders of the virulently anti-Tutsi radio 
station, Radio Télévision Libres des Milles Collines (RTLM), Ferdinand Nahimana and 
Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza. The third accused was the founder, owner and editor of 
the Hutu extremist newspaper Kangura (the imperative form of the Kinyarwanda 
word meaning "awaken"), Hassan Ngze.  
 
The ICTR Trial Chamber convicted all three accused inter alia of direct and public 
incitement to genocide. The convictions of Nahimana and Barayagwiza for 
incitement to genocide were based on their failure, as superiors at RTLM, to take 
reasonable and necessary measures to prevent the perpetration of criminal acts 
among their staff.61 On appeal, the Appeals Chamber overturned the conviction of 
Barayagwiza on the basis that, unlike Nahimana, he did not exercise effective control 
over RTLM journalists at the time that certain criminal speeches were broadcast. The 
Appeals Chamber also confirmed the conviction of Ngeze on the basis of certain 
articles in Kangura that amounted to direct and public incitement to genocide. 
 
The Appeals Chamber judgment confirmed incitement as an inchoate crime.62 The 
Appeals Chamber held that "the crime of direct and public incitement to commit 
                                                 
61  See ICTR Statute, Art 6(3): "The fact that any of the acts referred to in arts 2 to 4 of the present 
Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal 
responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit 
such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures 
to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof." 
62  ICTR Prosecutor v Nahimana et al (Appeals Chamber: Judgment) Case No ICTR-99-52-A, 28 
November 2007 para 678 (hereafter Nahimana (Appeals Chamber)). See also Nahimana (Trail 
Chamber) para 1015. 
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genocide is an inchoate offence, punishable even if no act of genocide has resulted 
therefrom".63 Consequently, the prosecution is not required to prove a causal 
connection between the act of incitement and subsequent acts of genocide in order 
to secure a conviction for direct and public incitement to genocide.64 
 
The judgment in Nahimana also provides a further nuance to the definition of the 
crime of incitement to commit genocide by drawing a line between direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide and hate speech. In this regard, the ICTR Appeals 
Chamber65 held as follows: 
 
The Appeals Chamber therefore concludes that when a defendant is indicted 
pursuant to Article 2(3)(c) of the Statute, he cannot be held accountable for hate 
speech that does not directly call for the commission of genocide. The Appeals 
Chamber is also of the opinion that, to the extent that not all hate speeches 
constitute direct incitement to commit genocide, the jurisprudence on incitement to 
hatred, discrimination and violence is not directly applicable in determining what 
constitutes direct incitement to commit genocide. 
 
Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber confirmed that context was an important factor 
in the determination of whether or not direct incitement to genocide had been 
committed.66 For the purpose of defining direct incitement, it appears that the actual 
words used are less important than the understanding thereof by the target 
audience and that:67 
                                                 
63  Nahimana (Appeals Chamber) para 678. 
64  This was essentially a moot point since the fact that genocide occurred in Rwanda in 1994 was a 
wellknown, notorious fact of which the ICTR Appeals Chamber has since taken judicial notice. 
See ICTR Prosecutor v Karemera, Ngirumpatse, Nzirorera (Decision on prosecutor's interlocutory 
appeal of decision on judicial notice) Case No ICTR-98-44-AR73(C) paras 34-35. See also 
Mugesera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2005) 2 SCR 100, 2005 SCC 40. 
This case was primarily concerned with the deportation of a Rwandan national, who had been 
granted residence in Canada. Such deportation was initiated pursuant to a Canadian law that 
allowed for the deportation of residents who have committed crimes. It was alleged that 
Mugesera had committed incitement to genocide in a speech made prior to leaving Rwanda. In 
the speech, Mugesera suggested that Tutsi corpses must be sent back to Ethiopia via the 
Nyaborongo River. The Canadian Supreme Court, with reference to the Trial Chamber decision in 
the Media case, held that "incitement [to genocide] is punishable by virtue of the criminal act 
alone irrespective of the result" (para 85). 
65  Nahimana (Appeals Chamber) para 693. 
66  Nahimana (Appeals Chamber) para 715; see also Akayesu para 557, in which the Trial Chamber 
held that "the direct element of incitement should be viewed in the light of its cultural and 
linguistic content." 
67  Akayesu para 558. In ICTR Prosecutor v Muvunyi (Trial Chamber: Judgment) Case No ICTR-
2000-55A-T, 12 September 2006 para 502 it was held that: "The 'direct' element requires more 
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…acts of incitement can be viewed as direct or not, by focusing mainly on the issue 
of whether the person for whom the message was intended immediately grasped 
the implication thereof. 
 
Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber was asked, by way of an amicus curiae brief, to 
determine whether the Trial Chamber had confused (or at least blurred the lines of 
distinction) between hate speech and incitement.68 However, the Appeals Chamber 
took the view that this was not the case69 and clarified its position as follows:70 
 
The Appeals Chamber considers that there is a difference between hate speech in 
general (or inciting discrimination or violence) and direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide. Direct incitement to commit genocide assumes that the speech is 
a direct appeal to commit an act referred to in Article 2(2) of the Statute; it has to 
be more than a mere vague or indirect suggestion. In most cases, direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide can be preceded or accompanied by hate speech, 
but only direct and public incitement to commit genocide is prohibited under Article 
2(3)(c) of the Statute. This conclusion is corroborated by the travaux préparatoires 
to the Genocide Convention.  
 
The ad hoc tribunals have reached separate conclusions as to whether hate speech 
which does not amount to direct and public incitement to commit genocide71 may be 
prosecuted for persecution as a crime against humanity.72 
                                                                                                                                                        
than a vague or indirect suggestion of incitement, and implies that the expression which is 
alleged to be inciteful, specifically provoke another to engage in criminal conduct. In considering 
whether incitement is direct, the specific context in which it takes place is important. Cultural 
and linguistic factors, as well as the kind of audience the message is addressed to, could help 
determine whether a particular speech qualifies as direct incitement. An important consideration 
for the Trial Chamber is whether the members of the audience to whom the message was 
directed immediately understood its implication" (footnotes omitted). 
68  Numerous scholars shared this concern. See for example, Orentlicher 2006 Am U Int'l L Rev. 
69  Nahimana (Appeals Chamber) para 715. 
70  Nahimana (Appeals Chamber) para 692 (footnotes omitted). 
71  Wouters and Verhoeven 2010 dx.doi.org 21: "[It] is clear that incitement to genocide should not 
be equated with all forms of hate speech. Hate speech's primary purpose is to distill hatred 
among the population against a particular group, which often includes the use of denigrating 
language to describe the targeted group. Despicable as this may be, as long as hate speech is 
not accompanied with an intent to incite the public to commit genocidal acts, it cannot be 
regarded as incitement to genocide." (footnote omitted) 
72  See ICTY Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez (Trial Chamber: Judgment) Case No IT-95-14/2-T, 26 
February 2001 para 209, where it was held that encouraging or promoting hatred on political 
grounds "does not by itself constitute persecution as a crime against humanity." However, in 
Nahimana (Trial Chamber) para 1072, the ICTR Trial Chamber held that "hate speech targeting a 
population on the basis of ethnicity, or other discriminatory grounds, reaches this level of gravity 
and constitutes persecution under Art 3(h) of its Statute. In Ruggiu, the Tribunal so held, finding 
that the radio broadcasts of RTLM, in singling out and attacking the Tutsi ethnic minority, 
constituted a deprivation of 'the fundamental rights to life, liberty and basic humanity enjoyed by 
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Hitherto, the distinction between public and private incitement has not given rise to 
any significant controversy as regards the interpretation thereof.73 In Akayesu,74 
with reference to the definition of the International Law Commission's Draft Code of 
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1996),75 public incitement was 
defined as: 
 
…a call for criminal action to a number of individuals in a public place or to 
members of the general public at large by such means as the mass media, for 
example, radio or television. 
 
5.3  Article 25(3)(e) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court 
 
The Rome Statute strongly reflects the wording of the Genocide Convention as 
regards the definition of direct and public incitement to commit genocide. According 
to article 25(3)(e): 
 
In accordance with this Statute a person shall be criminally responsible and liable 
for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person: […] 
(e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to 
commit genocide. 
 
From the above it is clear that incitement to commit any of the other offences under 
article 5 of the Statute (crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression) does 
not constitute a crime under the Rome Statute. This also forms part of the Rome 
Statute's inheritance from the Genocide Convention and from the respective Statutes 
of the ad hoc tribunals.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
members of the wider society'" (footnote omitted). In Nahimana (Appeals Chamber) the issue 
seems to have been left open. See Gordon 2013 Vanderbilt J Transnat'l L. 
73  Timmerman expounds on the dangers respectively associated with public and private incitement: 
"Whilst public incitement […] is primarily dangerous because it leads to the creation of an 
atmosphere of hatred and xenophobia and entails the exertion of influence on people's minds, 
incitement in private is dangerous because the instigator succeeds in triggering a determination 
in the instigatee's mind to commit a particular crime" (my emphasis). See Timmerman 2006 
IRRC 825. 
74  Akayesu para 556. 
75  Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1996), Art 2(3)(f). 
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The approach to direct and public incitement to commit genocide in the Rome 
Statute differs from the approach thereto in the respective Statutes of the ad hoc 
tribunals in one significant respect. Direct and public incitement to commit genocide 
is not explicitly treated as an independent substantive crime under the Rome 
Statute. Article 5 of the Rome Statute lists the substantive crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court only as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
aggression.76 These crimes are further distinguished through being individually 
defined in separate provisions in the Statute (respectively in articles 6, 7 and 8). 
Thus, in contrast to the criminalisation of direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide as a distinct crime under the Genocide Convention as well as in the 
respective statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, the Rome Statute does not explicitly 
create the separate crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide. 
Rather, incitement to genocide is regarded as a mode of responsibility in respect of 
genocide that may lead the ICC to an interpretation of the crime that differs from 
what we have seen hitherto.77 This argument is supported by the location of the 
reference to direct and public incitement to commit genocide in article 25 entitled 
"Individual Criminal Responsibility" and specifically in article 25(3), which deals 
generally with modes of participation. Davies78 has argued that the Rome Statute 
presents a "watered down" version of the prohibition of direct and public incitement 
to commit genocide under international law. He argues that the classification of 
incitement in the Rome Statute as a mode of participation in a core crime rather 
than as a separate crime means that a conviction for incitement to genocide is 
predicated on showing a causal link between such incitement and subsequent acts of 
genocide.79 He argues that this may frustrate efforts to obtain convictions of 
                                                 
76  With regards to aggression, the original text of the Rome Statute stipulated that the Court may 
not prosecute acts of aggression until the crime was defined and conditions for the exercise of 
jurisdiction were set out [Art 5(2)]. At the Kampala Review Conference, Art 5(2) was recalled 
from the Statute and a number of amendments accepted. Article 8 bis contains a definition of 
the crime of aggression while Art 15 bis and Art 15 ter set out the grounds for the exercise of 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. The Court may not, however, exercise jurisdiction 
before 1 January 2017, whereafter State Parties may decide to activate such jurisdiction. 
77  Cassese International Criminal Law 404. 
78  Davies 2009 Harv Hum Rts J. 
79  Davies 2009 Harv Hum Rts J 269-270. 
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perpetrators of incitement to genocide, such as those successfully (and correctly) 
handed down in Akayesu and Nahimana by the ICTR.80  
 
However, it is also quite plausible for incitement to be treated, as it has been by the 
ICTR, as a separate (inchoate) crime under the Statute.81 As regards the 
interpretation of the Rome Statute on this point, it is beyond the scope of this article 
to attempt to provide a definitive answer. In any event, the interpretation of direct 
and public incitement to commit genocide under the Rome Statute remains to be 
clarified by the ICC as no person has yet been charged under article 25(3)(e) of the 
Statute. With this in mind, and considering that it took ten years for the ICC to hand 
down its first conviction,82 it seems safe to conclude that it is unlikely that the ICC 
will provide any guidance to South African courts in the very near future as to the 
scope of direct and public incitement to commit genocide under the Rome Statute. 
 
6  Prosecuting incitement to genocide in South Africa 
 
6.1  Contemporary relevance of the crime in South Africa 
 
The role of incitement before and during genocide has been outlined above (para 2). 
These considerations are by no means immaterial to post-transitional South Africa. 
Although it may be said that the South African transition to democracy has been 
successful, a successful political transition does not automatically equate to complete 
social reconciliation, which is a long-term objective. The lack of true social 
reconciliation and the contemporary relevance of the crime of incitement to commit 
genocide are exemplified by an ongoing debate surrounding the existence of a so-
called "Boer genocide" in South Africa. Those who argue in favour of its existence 
frequently cite crime statistics (the high murder rate among white South African 
                                                 
80  Davies 2009 Harv Hum Rts J 269-270. 
81  See for example, Werle 2007 JICJ 956: "While Art 25(3)(a) to (d) addresses modes of criminal 
participation, subparagraphs (e) and (f) deal with incitement to genocide and with attempt and 
abandonment; this might be seen as misleading from a structural point of view, because neither 
incitement to genocide nor attempt can be classified as modes of participation, but should rather 
be classified as inchoate crimes." 
82  See ICC Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Trial Chamber I: Judgment) Case No ICC-01/04-
01/06, 14 March 2012. 
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farmers relative to other population groups) along with the failure to act 
preventatively on the part of the South African government as proof of an ongoing 
genocide. However, this in and of itself does not provide conclusive proof of the 
existence of a "Boer genocide" in South Africa as genocidal intent on the part of the 
alleged perpetrator(s) must first be proved. Others have argued that the singing of 
the song Dubula Ibhunu (parts of the lyrics of the song may be translated to mean 
"shoot the Boer/farmer", "shoot the Boers/farmers they are rapists/robbers")83 
constitutes incitement to commit genocide.84 
 
Within these often heated debates, the politics of accusation and denial have tended 
to cloud the actual facts and legal issues. While the term "genocide" is now part of 
the global lexicon, there may still be a general misapprehension as regards the legal 
requirements of genocide under international law, which is not confined only to 
South Africa. This article is not directly concerned with these issues. Nor will I 
attempt to discern whether or not any international crimes have been or are being 
committed in South Africa. However, it is valuable to contemplate these 
controversies from a broader perspective as they illustrate the potential long-term 
                                                 
83  See Benesch 2011 voicesthatpoison.files.wordpress.com. According to Benesch, speech asserting 
that the audience faces serious danger from the victim group is a hallmark of incitement (known 
as "accusation in a mirror").  
84  In African National Congress v Harmse: In Re Harmse v Vawda (Afriforum Intervening) 2011 5 
SA 460 (GSJ) para 139, the High Court held that "the publication and chanting of the words 
Dubula ibhunu prima facie satisfies the crime of incitement to commit murder." According to 
Snyman, the use of the phrase "Kill the Boer, kill the farmer" is "without a doubt punishable as 
incitement to murder" (see Snyman Strafreg 312 fn 90). One would indeed be hard pressed to 
deny a measure of similarity between the song "Dubula Ibhunu" and the song 
"Tubatsembesembe" ("We will kill them all"), which was sung by Hutu extremists prior to the 
Rwandan genocide. On the other hand, the cultural meaning of the song and the specific 
circumstances under which it was sung will also be put on the scale in order to determine if the 
song constitutes direct incitement to murder or genocide. It may be possible to defend the song 
on the basis of its cultural and historical significance, thereby denying that it is intended to incite 
violence against whites. One may also argue that the lyrics of the song are not to be taken 
literally and pose no clear and present danger in respect of violence or acts of genocide. In this 
regard one may perhaps liken the song to the French national anthem, La Marseillaise, which 
contains the following lyrics: "To arms citizens! Form your battalions! March! March! Let impure 
blood water our fields!" Overall, the message conveyed must be unambiguous as regards the 
meaning that attaches thereto because of the specific context in which it is made as well as the 
specific audience to which it is directed. See Nahimana (Appeals Chamber) para 701: "The 
principal consideration is thus the meaning of the words used in the specific context: it does not 
matter that the message may appear ambiguous to another audience or in another context. On 
the other hand, if the discourse is still ambiguous even when considered in its context, it cannot 
be found beyond reasonable doubt to constitute direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide." 
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value of clear legal prohibitions that may help to pro-actively counter instances of 
collective violence, especially genocide. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that 
the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide is narrow in scope in 
general, which is a result of its inchoate nature as well as the fact that it must be 
committed with a particular form of fault, namely, genocidal intent.85  
 
6.2  Avenues for the prosecution of incitement to commit genocide in 
South Africa 
 
As yet there have been no prosecutions for incitement to genocide in South Africa. 
In view of existing domestic and international law as regards incitement and 
incitement to genocide outlined above, it is possible to argue that there are currently 
three legal avenues available for the domestic prosecution of incitement to genocide 
in South Africa. Each of these is discussed separately below. 
 
6.2.1  Prosecution under the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1965 
 
De facto incitement to genocide may be prosecuted as the purely domestic and 
distinct statutory crime of incitement under the Riotous Assemblies Act read together 
with the ICC Act. The wording of section 18 of the Riotous Assemblies Act (see para 
3.2 above) seems to indicate that the inciter need only have intent (in any form)86 as 
regards moving the incitee towards the commission of "any offence" under South 
African criminal law in order to be held liable. Arguably, "any offence" includes the 
statutory crime of genocide as per the ICC Act as well as genocide as a customary 
international law crime under section 232 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996.  
                                                 
85  According to Schabas, however, proving genocidal intent on the part of an inciter is in practice 
aided by the fact that genocidal intent can often be readily inferred from the content of the 
message. See Schabas Genocide 326. The prosecution of incitement to commit genocide is also 
to an extent aided by its inchoate nature. International and foreign jurisprudence has confirmed 
that a conviction for incitement to commit genocide is not premised on furnishing proof that 
actual acts of genocide have taken place or that such acts will take place in the future. Thus, in 
order to prosecute incitement to genocide at the domestic level, the prosecution is not required 
to navigate through the political minefield of proving the existence of an act of genocide. 
86  However, as was noted above (in para 5.2), an inciter must harbour genocidal intent in order to 
be convicted of incitement to genocide. 
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The prosecution of incitement to genocide as statutory incitement holds the potential 
pragmatic benefit that the act of incitement in question does not necessarily have to 
be "direct" or "public" (as is required under international law) in order for it to result 
in criminal liability. These qualifiers are unknown to the legal concept of incitement 
in South African criminal law. Therefore, the scope of incitement to genocide under 
the Riotous Assemblies Act is potentially broader than that of the international law 
crime of direct and public incitement to genocide, which should, at least in theory, 
enhance the preventative value of the crime. Furthermore, a person may be liable 
for incitement under South African law even where the specific identity of the incitee 
is unknown to the inciter.87 For example, a speech provoking or inciting genocide 
that is made to a public audience that consists of individuals unknown to the speaker 
would constitute the offence of incitement to genocide under the Riotous Assemblies 
Act. Also, it is well established that the act of incitement need not be successful in 
order to constitute a crime under South African law.88  
 
However, in spite of the advantages that the prosecution of incitement to genocide 
under the Riotous Assemblies Act may hold, there are various reasons to doubt that 
the Riotous Assemblies Act is a proper basis for the prosecution of incitement to 
genocide. A significant criticism that can be levelled against prosecution in terms of 
the Riotous Assemblies Act relates to its limited jurisdiction, especially in comparison 
with that which is provided for in respect of crimes under the ICC Act.89 The 
broad(er) prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction provided for under the ICC Act 
(see para 6.2.2) reflects the seriousness of the offence and the interests of the 
international community in the suppression and punishment not only of the core 
international crimes such as genocide, but also preventative prosecution of crimes 
                                                 
87  R v Segale 1960 1 SA 721 (A). In this case, the appellant's conviction for inciting "non-European" 
labourers on the Witwatersrand as a group to commit a statutory offence, which consisted of a 
"stay away" from work in protest, was upheld. Thus, a person may be guilty of incitement under 
the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956 even without focusing the act of incitement on any 
specific individual(s). 
88  See para 3 above. 
89  In general, South African courts exercise jurisdiction only in respect of crimes committed within 
South African territory. See Joubert Criminal Procedure 39-40. However, in S v Basson 2007 1 
SACR 566 (CC) it was recognised that a South African court has jurisdiction to try an offence 
under the Riotous Assemblies Act, in casu conspiracy under s 18(2)(a), where there is a "real 
and substantial link" between the offence and South Africa (para 226). 
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related thereto, such as incitement to genocide. Limiting the prosecution of 
incitement to genocide to the narrow jurisdictional ambit of the Riotous Assemblies 
Act would undermine the new vision of ICL in which the enforcement of international 
criminal norms rests primarily on the willingness and ability of states to actively put 
an end to impunity for the perpetrators of international law crimes by extending the 
traditional limits of their criminal jurisdiction.90 
 
A further reason to doubt whether the Riotous Assemblies Act should serve as the 
basis for the prosecution of incitement to genocide in South Africa is the fact that it 
could then be argued that the hitherto non-existent crimes of incitement to commit 
crimes against humanity and incitement to commit war crimes can also be 
prosecuted thereunder pursuant to the "incitement to any offence" argument. This is 
clearly an unacceptable result not supported by any international legal authority. 
 
Finally, there is a possibility that the prosecution of incitement to genocide may be 
opposed on the basis that it violates the principle of legality. Accordingly, it could be 
argued that direct and public incitement to commit genocide is, like the other crimes 
under the ICC Act, a distinct crime under international law. However, unlike 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, which are explicitly defined and 
criminalised by way of the ICC Act, conduct amounting to direct and public 
incitement to genocide is not domestically proscribed and criminalised. Thus, it could 
be argued that the Riotous Assemblies Act cannot serve as a basis for the 
prosecution of incitement to genocide until the ICC Act is amended to specifically 
proscribe and provide for such a crime.91 Prior to such amendment, the principle 
nullum crimen sine lege may be invoked to preclude any prosecutorial efforts based 
on a joint reading of the Riotous Assemblies Act and the ICC Act. 
 
                                                 
90  See also para 7.1 below. 
91  Should the ICC Act be amended thus, the use of the Riotous Assemblies Act as a basis for the 
prosecution of incitement to genocide would become redundant. As regards amendment of the 
ICC Act, see para 7 below. 
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6.2.2  The crime of direct and public incitement to genocide under the 
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 
27 of 2002 
 
In order to honour its obligations regarding the prosecution of international crime 
pursuant to the Rome Statute, as well as to bring its substantive criminal law in line 
with the scheme of complementarity contained therein, South Africa has enacted 
national implementation legislation in the form of the ICC Act. Through the ICC Act, 
the crimes under the Rome Statute have been become part of South African law. 
According to section 4(1) of the ICC Act:92 
 
Despite anything to the contrary in any other law of the Republic, any person who 
commits a crime, is guilty of an offence [...]. 
 
According to section 1(vii) of the ICC Act, references to "crime" in the Act "means 
the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes" (a reflection of 
article 5 of the Rome Statute). In turn, the respective definitions of these crimes 
have become part of South African national law through Schedule I, which is 
appended to the ICC Act. Parts 1 to 3 of the Schedule contain, respectively, the 
definitions of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes which are derived 
entirely from the definitions contained, respectively, in articles 6 to 8 of the Rome 
Statute. Consequently, the core crimes of international law are now part of the body 
of criminal offences that constitute South African criminal law and may be 
prosecuted as such if the offence falls within the jurisdiction provided for in the ICC 
Act.  
 
                                                 
92  The ICC Act further stipulates that persons found guilty under the ICC Act are "liable upon 
conviction to a fine or imprisonment, including imprisonment for life, or such imprisonment 
without the option of a fine, or both a fine and such imprisonment." Since the distinct acts (or 
modes of participation), which may be committed with genocidal intent, vary greatly in their 
severity, a minimum sentencing provision would have made little sense. The wording of the ICC 
Act as regards punishment is broad enough to provide the necessary discretion to a court to 
hand down a sentence that is fair under the specific circumstances. In this regard the court may 
consider the quantum and quality of the punishment meted out by international criminal courts 
for similar offences. 
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According to the feature of complementarity contained in article 17 of the Rome 
Statute, read together with the jurisdictional requirements in section 4(3) of the ICC 
Act, South Africa bears primary responsibility for the prosecution of the perpetrators 
of the crimes contained in the Rome Statute and may do so before a domestic court 
if: 
 
(a) that person is a South African citizen; or 
(b) that person is not a South African citizen but is ordinarily resident in the 
Republic; or 
(c) that person, after the commission of the crime, is present in the territory 
of the Republic; or 
(d) that person has committed the said crime against a South African citizen 
or against a person who is ordinarily resident in the Republic. 
 
A crime committed outside the territory of South Africa in any of these four 
circumstances is regarded as having been committed within the territory of South 
Africa. Section 4(3) is of particular significance since it extends jurisdiction to 
persons who are not South African citizens but present in South African territory and 
to non-South Africans who have committed core crimes against South African 
citizens. According to Du Plessis93 this is "a progressive and potentially far-reaching 
aspect of South Africa's ICC Act." The ICC Act thus provides for qualified 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in respect of crimes transplanted from the Rome Statute. 
 
The ICC Act does not make any explicit references to "direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide" as specifically provided for in article 25(3)(e) of the Rome Statute. 
Therefore, the criminalisation of incitement to genocide under the ICC Act can at 
best be read into that Act with reference to the values, principles and rights 
contained in the Constitution, the purpose of the ICC Act itself, and the objectives 
and obligations outlined in the Rome Statute. The long title of the ICC Act outlines 
the purposes of the Act as inter alia ensuring both the effective implementation of 
the Rome Statute in South Africa and that the country complies with its obligations 
set out in the Rome Statute. According to section 2 of the ICC Act, any court 
applying the Act must consider, and may apply, conventional international law 
                                                 
93  Du Plessis 2007 JICJ 463. 
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(including particularly the Rome Statute and, for example, the Genocide 
Convention), customary international law and comparable foreign law.94 
 
However, the ICC Act refers only to genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes as "crime" for the purposes of the Act.95 The failure to explicitly recognise 
incitement to genocide in the ICC Act, whether unintentional or deliberate, 
represents a legislative oversight. Whatever the reason for the oversight, the fact 
remains that this legislative omission poses a fundamental problem as regards the 
prosecution of incitement to genocide under the ICC Act, namely, that the crime of 
incitement to genocide does not exist as a distinct crime in terms of the Act. 
Arguably the reading-in of a substantive crime would represent a step too far, since 
any conviction pursuant to such a reading-in would violate the fundamental 
constitutional and criminal law principle of nullum crimen sine lege as well as the 
judiciary's constitutional imperative, in accordance with the constitutional principle of 
separation of powers, to respect the exclusive right of Parliament to make national 
laws. 
 
6.2.3  Section 232 of the Constitution: The crime of direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide under customary international law 
 
In theory, direct and public incitement to commit genocide may be prosecuted 
directly in terms of the common law.96 According to section 232 of the Constitution: 
 
                                                 
94  The decision in Southern African Litigation Centre v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2012 
10 BCLR 1089 (GNP) provides evidence of the willingness of the South African judiciary to 
interpret the ICC Act in a purposive manner that may broaden the Act's scope. The case 
concerned an application for judicial review of a decision by the South African Police Service 
("SAPS") not to investigate allegation of torture constituting crimes against humanity committed 
by Zimbabweans against Zimbabweans in Zimbabwe. In a precedent setting judgment, the Court 
directed the SAPS to conduct an investigation into the matter. The Court referred specifically to 
the purpose and object of the ICC Act (para 31) and highlighted "an international consensus on 
the normative desirability of prosecuting [perpetrators of crimes against humanity]" (para 27). It 
must be noted, however, that the Respondents have obtained leave to appeal the decision 
before the Supreme Court of Appeal. As regards the use of foreign law in the interpretation of 
the ICC Act, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Mugesera is noteworthy (see fn 64 
above). 
95  ICC Act, s 1 (Definitions). 
96  See Kemp Criminal Law 564-565. 
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Customary international law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the 
Constitution or an Act of Parliament. 
 
The existence of the crime of incitement to genocide under customary international 
law would have to be established through evidence showing widespread and uniform 
state practice accompanied by opinio juris (sive necessitatis). Thus, it must be 
shown that there was, at the time that the offence was committed, a belief among 
states that direct and public incitement to commit genocide is prohibited by 
customary international law and that the prosecution thereof constitutes an 
obligation under international law. The presentation of such an argument in a South 
African court is unprecedented, and to deal with it fully is beyond the scope of this 
article. However, it must be pointed out that proving the existence of the crime 
under customary international law is "no simple task" from a pragmatic point of 
view.97  
 
The task is arguably made less difficult by the fact that direct and public incitement 
to commit genocide as a crime has existed in near-codified form since the adoption 
of the Genocide Convention. It might be argued broadly that such a crime does exist 
under customary international law, by referring to the widespread ratification of the 
Genocide Convention and contending that as a result the Convention as a whole 
forms part of customary international law. Such an argument could be supported 
with reference to the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals and article 25(3)(e) of 
the Rome Statute. Pursuant to the above argument, direct and public incitement to 
genocide is, due to it being a customary international law crime, a prosecutable 
offence under South African law on the basis of the indirect incorporation thereof by 
section 232 of the Constitution.  
 
There is to date no precedent for the prosecution of international crimes pursuant to 
section 232 of the Constitution. Any prosecution on this basis faces two problems: 
first, proving the existence of the crime under customary international law and, 
                                                 
97  Kemp Criminal Law 565. 
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second, with regard to the principle of legality.98 Thus, the prosecution of incitement 
to commit genocide as a crime under customary international law in South Africa, 
although theoretically possible, is improbable at present.99 
 
7  Should the ICC Act be amended to specifically provide for the crime 
of direct and public incitement to commit genocide? 
 
7.1  The need to amend the ICC Act? 
 
Unlike the Riotous Assemblies Act, the ICC Act is specifically intended to reflect, 
within the South African criminal justice system, an international consensus on the 
normative desirability of the prohibition of certain forms of conduct under 
international law. This consensus is further reflected in the general willingness of 
states to stretch the traditional limits of their criminal jurisdiction in respect of 
certain international crimes in order to put an end to the culture of impunity in 
respect of international crimes. The jurisdiction provided for under the ICC Act 
broadly reflects South Africa's acquiescence in these developments. As discussed 
above, this commitment to a limited form of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction 
would not be reflected by the prosecution of incitement to genocide pursuant to the 
Riotous Assemblies Act, in terms of which enforcement jurisdiction is based on the 
traditional principle of territoriality and thus more limited. Nor can it be. The Riotous 
Assemblies Act came into being in the early stages of apartheid with the broad 
purpose of preventing hostilities between racial groups that were mostly state 
engineered.100 Most of the provisions in the Act have since been repealed. 
Furthermore, the Act was promulgated well before the widespread acceptance of the 
                                                 
98  It could be hypothesised that the inaugural prosecution of direct and public incitement to 
genocide solely on the basis of s 232 and its criminalisation under customary international law 
would be unconstitutional since it would violate the nullum crimen sine lege principle in s 35(3)(l) 
of the Constitution, which holds that every accused person has the right "not to be convicted for 
an act or omission that was not an offence under either national or international law at the time 
it was committed or omitted." It could be argued that the prosecution of a crime that exists 
purely under customary international law and the existence of which might be proved in court 
only after the commission thereof is inconsistent with s 35(3)(l) of the Constitution. 
99  Kemp Criminal Law 564. 
100  The long title of the Act reads as follows: "To consolidate the laws relating to riotous assemblies 
and the prohibition of the engendering of feelings of hostility between the European and non-
European inhabitants of the Republic and matters incidental thereto […]." 
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universality principle, a legal development that is reflected in both the Rome Statute 
and the ICC Act. For these reasons, the prosecution of incitement to commit 
genocide under the Riotous Assemblies Act would amount to using anachronistic 
legislation to combat a form of criminality which is not only a unique species of 
international crime, but also novel to the South African domestic legal system. 
 
Clearly, it is preferable to prosecute incitement to genocide under the ICC Act rather 
than under any of the other theoretical options outlined above. However, this 
immediately presents a further problem, namely, the lack of legal certainty regarding 
the prohibition of incitement to genocide under the ICC Act. This problem is to some 
extent related to the fact that there is also currently a measure of uncertainty 
regarding the scope of the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide 
under the Rome Statute, which is unlikely to be resolved in the near future. 
 
Considering the various strengths and weaknesses of the available options for the 
prosecution of direct and public incitement to commit genocide under South African 
law (as outlined in para 6.2), it is submitted that the ICC Act must be amended to 
provide for the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide under 
South African law. Although it is hypothetically possible to invoke the Riotous 
Assemblies Act as a basis for prosecution or for the separate crime of direct and 
public incitement to commit genocide to be read into the ICC Act, the proposed 
amendment will provide legal certainty as regards the existence of the crime 
(proscribing certain conduct) and also provide for the punishment thereof as 
required by the principle of legality. It must also be considered that, unlike the core 
crimes under the Rome Statute, there has to date been no act of constitutional 
ratification in respect of the distinct crime of incitement to genocide as required from 
Parliament in respect of international agreements under section 231 of the 
Constitution.  
 
The creation of a distinct domestic crime of incitement to genocide would place 
South Africa in a position to prosecute incitement to genocide pre-emptively and 
preventatively. The submission to amend the ICC Act is supported by South Africa's 
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international legal obligation pursuant to the Genocide Convention to prevent and 
prosecute genocide as well as by the substance of the non-binding, emerging norm 
of "responsibility to protect" (R2P).101 Thus, the amendment will be valuable not only 
from a preventative perspective, but is also necessary as a measure that will make 
South Africa compliant with its international legal obligations. 
 
7.2  The way forward 
 
It is submitted that the ICC Act should be amended so as to criminalise direct and 
public incitement to commit genocide in South Africa. An in-depth discussion of the 
legislative details surrounding such an amendment is beyond the scope of this 
article. However, it is at this stage clear that the definitional elements of the crime 
consist broadly of the following: 1) direct and public incitement; 2) made with the 
intent to advocate, promote or cause the commission of acts of genocide; and 3) 
committed with genocidal intent (the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such). Furthermore, considering the 
established approach to common law and statutory incitement under South African 
law as well as the existing international and foreign jurisprudence regarding direct 
and public incitement to commit genocide, there is no need to qualify the prohibition 
any further by, for example, providing that the crime is committed "irrespective of 
the success thereof." 
 
Finally, the proposed legislative amendment would not pose a problem as regards 
the nulla poena sine lege principle as the ICC Act provides for the imposition of 
penalties in section 4(1). Considering the inchoate nature of the crime, the 
maximum punishment would very rarely be imposed. This, however, must be 
considered on a case by case basis and lies within the discretion of the court, which 
must take into account all relevant factors.  
 
                                                 
101  See UNGA Resolution 60(1) (2005) para 138. R2P is an emerging norm of international security 
and human rights that views sovereignty as a responsibility and not as an absolute right. 
Accordingly, states have a responsibility to protect their citizens from various international 
crimes. 
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8  Conclusion 
 
International problems often originate at the domestic level. For this reason, the 
prevention and punishment of international crimes must, as far as possible, be 
addressed primarily from within domestic legal systems. It is now widely accepted 
that the future success of the project of international criminal justice is vested in the 
ability and willingness of states as regards the prosecution of international crimes, 
with the ICC acting as an institution of last resort in respect of the core crimes of 
international law. South Africa has, through ratification of the Rome Statute as well 
as adoption of the ICC Act, formally indicated its willingness to be a partner in this 
project. These are laudable developments. However, a willingness to prosecute 
international crimes domestically amounts to little without enabling the domestic 
legal system to do so effectively. These crimes have been created by the 
international community and are partly aimed at the prevention of collective 
violence. Thus, they are pro-active legal rules requiring pro-active measures for their 
implementation by states. Incitement to genocide is arguably the best example of 
such a preventative crime, yet it is not at present clearly defined and explicitly 
criminalised in South African law. In general, there is a lack of recognition of the fact 
that words may be as dangerous as physical weapons in the context of genocide and 
especially in the preliminary stages thereof. To counteract this danger, another kind 
of 'weapon' may be used, namely, timely domestic prosecution pursuant to a clearly 
defined and pre-existing criminal prohibition of incitement to genocide. 
 
It must be reiterated that the inherently narrow scope of the domestic crime of 
incitement is reduced even further in the context of incitement to commit genocide 
on account of the additional requirement of genocidal intent on the part of the 
inciter as well as the fact that only direct and public manifestations thereof are 
criminalised. However, the assumption that the commission of incitement to 
genocide may be a rare occurrence in South Africa, and the successful prosecution 
thereof perhaps even less likely, do not trivialise its criminalisation (it may be 
compared to the crime of treason). On the contrary, the fact that incitement to 
genocide is super-preventative in nature and purpose creates a crime of unique and 
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crucial importance, particularly within divided societies and especially in the long run. 
In South Africa, the controversy over the "Kill the Boer" song indicates the potential 
value of legal certainty as regards the domestic prosecution of incitement to 
genocide. Simply put, effective prevention of genocide at the domestic level requires 
effective prevention of the historical precursor to genocide, namely, incitement to 
genocide, especially considering the fact that it is the only precursory act of 
genocide currently criminalised under international law. At present, only the 
prosecution and punishment of acts of genocide are clearly provided for by South 
African criminal law. The existence of clear legal rules that address (mostly) 
genocide after the fact but not genocide before the fact is incongruous, especially 
bearing in mind the goal of genocide prevention. For this reason, as well as taking 
onto account the instrumental role of incitement before and during genocide as 
outlined in para 2, it is submitted that it is both logical and essential for the distinct 
crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide to be recognised by South 
African criminal law. It is further submitted that legislative amendment of the ICC 
Act will provide the most effective solution to the problems outlined in this article. 
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